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'"
The Challenger lAunch Decision: Risky Technology, Cui/un ond Deviance 01
NASA. by Diane Vaughan. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1996, 575
pages. Cloth, $24.95.

The Challenger tragedy represents an important case for understanding the
social bases of technical failuTe. The technical reasons for the explosion are now
well known: the failure under cold-weather conditions of a pair of o-rings. used
as seals in the solid rocket booster (SRB). The tragedy had a sociological as well
as a technical cause, however. NASA and the SRB contractor, Morton Thiokol.
had advance warning of the possibility of o-ring malfunction in cold weather. Yel
the decision was made to launch; understanding the tragedy thus requires under
standing this decision.
Diane Vaughan has written an exhaustive. thearelieally sophisticated, and
mosdy persuasive account of the Challenger launch decision which questions the
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conclusion reached by earlier investigations. The view that the tragedy reflected
"amoral calculation" by mid-level managers who suppressed safety concerns
makes little sense, she argues, in view of NASA's nannal concern for safety and
the disastrous consequences of ignoring risk, Understanding the launch decision
requires moving beyond individual actors to explore the organizational and en
vironmental context in which it was made. Invoking anthropological ideas about
"thick description," she plunges the reader into the culture of NASA and engi
neering and the history of the ill-fated a-rings.
According to Vaughan, the Challenger launch decision was made by moral
individuals who responded to production pressures but consistently abided by the
set of rules governing the definition of safety and risk. Engineers and managers
were aware of problems with the o-rings, but they evaluated the evidence of
o-ring damage using consensual procedures consistent with engineering and in
dustry principles. Incrementally, they came to the conclusion that the o-rings were
"safe" because they were redundant (a second o-ring would back up the first).
There was some risk, as evidenced by damage to primary and even secondary
o-rings, but it was within acceptable limits.
The work group's belief in the acceptability of this risk was supported by
larger organizational and environmental contingencies. Engineering culture ac
commodated technical compromise, and the original "technical" culture of
NASA had been modified to include bureaucratic and political concerns, requiring
the balancing of all three. Vaughan also shows how "structural secrecy" made it
difficult for NASA administrators to "know" that there was a safety problem.
Organizational inertia made it difficult to overturn previous conclusions about
safety; specialization limited understanding, as did technical jargon and the over
abundance of information; regulatory mechanisms were ineffective.
On the eve of the launch, decision makers at NASA were concerned enough
about the effects of cold temperatures to ask for a teleconference with Thiokol.
Thiokol engineers recommended against launch, arguing [hat risk increased un
acceptably in cold temperatures. However. they did not have unambiguous hard
data to back up their recommendation. This prevented an effective formal chal
lenge to the belief in o-ring safety; various obstacles to communication limited
the effectiveness of the warnings the engineers were able to send out.
On the whole, Vaughan mounts an effective critique of the amoral calculation
hypothesis. She provides abundant evidence indicating thai procedures were fol
lowed and that there was a pervasive belief in the safety of the o-rings; similarly,
she shows that the view that rules were violated is based on a misunderstanding
of NASA's procedures. Nevertheless, Vaughan may read more into this than is
warranted. She admits in her conclusion that the normalization of deviance may,
in other contexts, facilitate misconduct, so why not in the Challenger case? There
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is no clear evidence that individuals used the rules to cover their conscious trans
gressions. But Vaughan's argument that there was no malfeasance too often boils

down to a simple insistence that actors followed the rules of decision making,
which tends to assume what needs to be proven.
This is particularly importanl as Vaughan appears to have relatively limited

access to events at Morton Thiokal. Since engineers there eventually cautioned
against cold-weather launch, and since Thiokol managers excluded the engineers
from the launch decision, it is conceivable that concern about the o-rings prior to
the Challenger incident was greater than it appeared. Circumstantial evidence to
this effect exists, since when NASA asked for a teleconference on the question,
the Thiokol engineers responded with an extremely unusual no-launch recom
mendation, even in the absence of "hard" evidence. If nothing else, Vaughan's
account does not allow us to dismiss completely this alternative hypothesis.
The conclusions Vaughan draws from her analysis are also persuasive and
reasonable, but could be expanded. She makes a strong case that the focus on
middle management malfeasance distracts from the real responsibility of orga
nizational and political elites in shaping the decision-making environment. It also
makes technical decisions seem deceptively routine. Most importantly, it draws
attention away from the ways in which routine organizational practices can "nor
malize" deviance.
Vaughan could add that Thiokol's apparent willingness to express its con
cerns about the o-rings only after NASA asked and NASA's aggressive reaction
to the unusual suggestion by a contractor that launch be delayed may suggest that
interorganizational hierarchy played a role in structuring this (and perhaps other)
technical decisions. Finally, her analysis reveals the limits of engineering culture.
Engineers' willingness to balance technical, economic, political, and bureaucratic
pressures reduced the chances that concerns about o-ring safety would be voiced
in unambiguous ways. And engineering "craft," as Vaughan calls it, which con
structs lasting conclusions on the basis of necessarily imperfect knowledge and
best estimates, may encourage certainty about matters which should be routinely
questioned.
Peter Meiksins, Cleveland State University
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